Intratumoral heterogeneity is defined as specimens from the same patient clustering into different groups by at least one analysis method (A1 or Ddx). Down-and-out distance of crash scene, frantically went door- kazhegeldin Bloomquist Earlene Arthur’s irises. Emergency Department and Outpatient Surgery Coding Quiz <br />True or False:<br />1.) If a patient is treated for a fracture in the ED with reduction and splint. Multisensory learning, or therapy include specially designed equipment to assist individuals with sensory processing disabilities to better overcome these obstacles. The Great Bangladesh Central Bank Heist. The Great Bangladesh Central Bank Heist. Posted by chempo on March 1. Hackers were suspected to have been responsible for sending SWIFT FIN payment instructions from Central Bank of Bangladesh to the Federal Reserve Bank NY on Feb 4 to request transfers of US$1 billion. The Feds executed 1 payment of US$2. Sri Lanka and 4 payments of US$8. Philippines before they realized something was wrong and stopped payment. Timeline(What is known as at 1. Mar 2. 01. 6): 1. May 2. 01. 5 – 4 US$ a/cs opened at RCBC, Jupiter Branch purportedly by, Michael Francis Cruz, Jessie Christopher Leprosa, Enrique Vasquez and Alfred Santos Vergara. Feb 2. 01. 6 – US$ a/c purportedly opened by William So Go. UpdateStar is compatible with Windows platforms. UpdateStar has been tested to meet all of the technical requirements to be compatible with Windows 10, 8.1, Windows 8. On vous propose de venir vous d Feb 2. 01. 6 – US Federal Reserve Bank received 3. SWIFT payment instructions from Bangladesh Central Bank (BCB) for payments totaling US$9. The Feds executed 1 payment (US$2. Sri Lanka bank, and 4 payments totaling US$8. RCBC. Then they suspended payments. Feb 2. 01. 6 — (Friday – BCB closed) – RCBC saw the US$8. Feb 2. 01. 5 (Monday – RCBC closed for Chinese New Year holiday) –BCC messaged RCBC to stop payment. Feb 2. 01. 6 – BCB resend messages to RCBC. Feb 2. 01. 6 – BCB called Bangko Sentral president, Anti- Money Laundering Commission started investigation. Feb 2. 01. 6 – NBI, Pangcor start investigation. Feb 2. 01. 6 – RCBC Jupiter Br manager Maria Deguito allegedly had meeting with William Go. Feb 2. 01. 6 – PDI broke the news. Mar 2. 01. 6 – Court of Appeals issues orders to RCBC, East- West Bank, BDO & PNB to freeze a/cs. Mar 2. 01. 6 – The Daily Star (in Bangladesh) broke the news. Mar 2. 01. 6 – Immigration stopped RCBC Jupiter Branch Manager departure at airport. Mar 2. 01. 6 – Philippines Senate conduct inquiry. Was BCB hacked?: Bank hackings have been in the manner of hackers gaining access to a bank’s system and having customers’ information and passwords (using methods like phishing) with which they then use to access the victims’ account and execute payments on the banks’ payment application, to their own designated account, mostly a fictitious vendor account. They do not need, and possibly cannot, break a bank’s encrypted data. To do this they need to plant a malware. If it’s a keylogger malware, the virus will record all keystrokes info and relay that to the hacker. If it’s a RAT (remote administrative tool) virus, the hackers monitor in realtime on their offsite screens. The forensic sleuths now at the bank say there was a malware planted in January 2. It is unlikely this malware is the culprit because it is simply too short a time for hackers to study the system. SWIFT is a very secure system and is practically impossible to hack into. Under normal banking operations, it is almost impossible for a hacker to execute the SWIFT payments. In almost all banks, dedicated workstations would be used for SWIFT payments and this would sit in a physically secured room. All the payments can only be released by 2 authorized personnel (high level authorized signatories) each having one half of a 1. All messages are encrypted. SWIFT has a concentrator in every country that they operate in. All banks’ SWIFT workstations are connected by leased line to the concentrator. From there the data gets into SWIFT IP- network to either Brussel or US offices. The only way hackers could access the SWIFT workstation is if there is internet access, either directly or indirectly. A good bank would have disabled the wifi, disk drive and USB of the SWIFT workstation to prevent mis- use. Some banks may have a SWIFT and inhouse system integration to facilitate auto- SWIFT message preparation, (an application to download payment transactions from inhouse banking system into the SWIFT system thus avoiding manual preparation) in which case the work station would be connected to their server, and exposed to the corporate network with internet access. Transaction volume is low for a central bank compared to a commercial bank so it is unlikely for BCB to have an integration application. It’s an issue of cost. The BCB payment instructions had to be sent when the SWIFT machines are online, which means probably just before the close of business on Feb 4. It could be MT1. 01 (batched payments) or MT1. When the bank sends a SWIFT message, the system sends an “ack”, acknowledgement or confirmation. This “ack” determines the legal responsibility of SWIFT to deliver the message to the intended party. Thus during the day, when the printers start throwing out these “ack”, surely BCB would have been alerted. This is why all banks in the world are waiting to understand how the hacking could have been done. It is my belief there is a high probability that there was no hacking but an inside job. Firstly, the central bank kept the government in total ignorance of the heist. But it was through a SWIFT message that betrays a lack of urgency. The BCB President called up Bangko Sentral president Tetengco Feb 1. The Bangladesh Finance Minister learned of the loss from the media one month after the incident. The Feds, as the paying bank, owes no legal obligation to ensure payments are in order. Their job is to make sure payments are properly executed as instructed so long as the order for payment is authentic. And the 3. 5 payment orders were authentic SWIFT messages. It was not a case of someone recreating a look alike. Note on Stop payment orders: There is something most people do not understand. If you issue a cheque to A and then you place a stop payment order, your bank will act on it if the cheque has not been cleared. That’s straight forward. But if the cheque has been cleared, there is no legal basis for you to claim the return of the funds directly from A’s bank (say BDO). To BDO, your payment to A is a valid one because the cheque has cleared. But your request to BDO puts them in a very difficult position. If your issue with A is a commercial one, it has nothing to do with them. If they freeze the funds and A issues cheques thinking they have the funds and BDO bounce those cheques, A may sue BDO. But if it’s a criminal issue and BDO release the funds to A, the bank may be called to answer for the consequences. Another eg – If you make an ATM transfer to a wrong account and you rush to the bank to report that and ask them to reverse the entries, sorry, not so fast Jose. Your bank will need to go and ask the party that received that error transfer and have their approval to return the funds to you. That is because your ATM transfer was a valid one. In the case of BCB, the circumstances are fairly obvious – a crime has been committed. It would be incumbent on RCBC to heed the freeze order immediately. International payments: All banks in the world maintain operating accounts with banks located in the city where the currency is settled. For US$ all banks maintain accounts with other banks in New York city. These NY banks are known as the correspondent banks of those banks that operate those accounts. For example RCBC’s US$ correspondent is Wachovia Bank NY. The US$ payment flows initiate from remitting bank (BCB) to their NY correspondent (Feds), to beneficiary bank’s correspondent bank (Wachovia NY) to beneficiary bank (RCBC) to designated branch (Jupiter Br) and to ultimate beneficiaries’s a/cs. In the Fed’s system, BCB’s a/c got debited and Wachovia NY a/c got credited. In Wachovia NY books they debit Reserve at Feds, credit Vostro (RCBC) a/c. In RCBC books they debit Nostro (Wachovia NY) a/c and credit customers’ a/cs. Federal Reserve Bank : The Feds raised the alarm when they saw the numerous payments to private individuals. It is not in the nature of central banks to make such payments. I applaud the Feds employees for their alertness. Bangladesh is 1. 0 hours ahead of New York, so BCB was closed by the time the Feds smelled something fishy. This kind of situation puts the paying banker on the spot. They had to make a decision that carries certain risks. What if the payments were all legitimate? The Feds would have to pay compensating interest to recipient banks for 3 days. The paying banker, in this case the Feds, owes no duty of responsibility to BCB so long as the payment instruction are authenticated, which in this case, they were. It is never the job of the paying banker to interpret and decide if payments are correct, if that were so, their job becomes untenable. The Feds’ action of stopping payment is not a contractual obligation, but simply being a prudent and responsible bank. Instead of suing the Feds, BCB should be eternally grateful to the Americans for saving them US$8. What I would like to know is – are there other recipient banks apart from RCBC and Pan Asia (the Sri Lanka bank)? If so, there are other scums in some other banks elsewhere. If not, then it’s absolutely unimaginable that almost US$1 billion could have been planned to be laundered through the casinos in Philippines. The spelling mistake that stopped a bank heist: The payment of US$2. Sri Lanka was stopped because the beneficiary name was spelt incorrectly. Media reports are wishy- washy here. My guess is that the beneficiary bank is Pan Asia Banking Corp and the beneficiary is Shalika Foundation. Deutsche Bank must be Pan Asia’s US$ correspondent. They could have let it pass (because the a/c number must apparently be correct), but in view of the large sum, they prudently with- hold payment. Pan Asia would have reverted to remitting bank (BCB) for instructions, so on Monday Feb 7, all hell broke loose in Dhaka. Notice that this scenario is different from the Feds. Here the payment is authenticated and the beneficiary bank has to apply the funds to the correct ultimate beneficiary. In the Feds case, the payments were authenticated and their responsibility is only to pay to the correct correspondent banks – they do not concern themselves with the beneficiary bank and ultimate beneficiaries. Who’s minding the store at RCBC: The Remittance Dept at HQ is concerned basically with the paperwork and routing the flows to the various branches.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
January 2017
Categories |